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Critical Terrorism Studies has produced an important volume of work in assessing 
and critiquing epistemological understandings of the War on Terror. Largely missing 
from this body of work, however, is the experience of those who are directly impacted 
by the policies of this global conflict. By rethinking the War on Terror as an 
experience of war, I posit a wider understanding of this war, by reassessing its 
temporal and spatial boundaries. Further, I seek to understand war through the 
experiences of those impacted by it. By providing a wider understanding of war and 
expanding our knowledge of its boundaries, I am able to show that those impacted by 
the policies of the War on Terror, can claim to have been subject to an experience of 
war, even when that experience takes place outside of the war zone.  
 
My work for the last fifteen years has predominantly been based in the field, meeting 
with those who have survived the impact of global counter-terrorism policies. It is 
based on the work I have produced out of their stories that this thesis provides an 
ontological reframing of how war is experienced. By relying on this work, I first show 
how epistemological constructions of the terrorism ‘threat’ can become a site of war 
itself. I then move on to extending our understanding of where the War on Terror 
might be experienced, beyond traditional notions of a warzone. Third, I present 
evidence that shifts our knowledge of the starting date of the War on Terror’s 
response to the attacks of 11 September 2001. The point is further made that an 
individual may be unaware of the existence of a war until they are impacted by its far-
reaching policies, even in a country that is not at war. My penultimate contribution in 
this thesis is to argue that the War on Terror represents a continuum in terms of its 
language, epistemology and ontology. Finally, I consider my own positionality to the 
subject of my fieldwork, as a Muslim who has worked for and on the cases of those 
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The War on Terror is largely seen as starting with the response to the September 11, 
2001 attacks on the United States through the US intervention in Afghanistan (Bush, 
2001 and Duffy, 2015: 393). Some of the hallmarks of this conflict include: the 
invasion of countries, such as Afghanistan and Iraq, the deployment of troops in the 
Horn of Africa, military and commercial flights involved in rendition, torture, 
arbitrary detention, sprawling surveillance legislation and a seemingly irreversible 
change of culture to the way in which we travel. 
 
Critical scholarship, such as that of Critical Terrorism Studies (CTS) has tackled 
various aspects of the War on Terror, whether it is in its discourses (Jackson, 2015 
and Gunning and Jackson, 2011), domestic counter-terrorism policy (Breen-Smyth, 
2014), or prosecution through war (Nazir, 2010) – but these analyses have 
predominantly been focused on epistemological understandings rather than 
ontological ones. Perhaps due to, or even to counter this trend, since 2009 I have been 
invited to participate, present and write for the CTS community due to my fieldwork 
experience specifically. As recently as April 2018, I was invited by one convener, 
with the following emphasis: “it'd be nice to have somebody with more experience in 
the field and to open up spaces for non-strictly academic views.” 
 
The contribution I have made so far has been to provide actual lived experiences of 
many of my clients and research subjects globally to the understanding of how war, 
counterinsurgency and counterterrorism policies impact on their lives directly. 
Through this research, I have been able to help provide a more complex 
understanding of what an experience of war within the War on Terror might look like. 
 
Based on the body of work I have produced, the central question addressed by this 
thesis is: Does the War on Terror, in the way it is prosecuted by states and 
experienced by humans, constitute a war experience even outside war zones? Can we 
understand domestic counterterrorism policy, that is not strictly inside a field of war, 
as creating an experience of war itself? Based on a key question asked by Christine 
Sylvester: “What if we think of war as experience, as something ordinary people 
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observe and suffer physically and emotionally depending on their locations?” 
(Sylvester, 2012: 483) 
 
How does this increase our understanding of the War on Terror and how does this 
impact on conceptualizations of war? By addressing these questions, my work makes 
the following key original contributions to knowledge:  
 
1. I consider how Critical Terrorism Studies can be moved beyond 
epistemological analyses. My review of Marc Sageman’s work is used as a 
platform to explain that a problematic epistemological understanding, 
becomes a site of ‘war’ and can lead to abuses of entire communities, but still, 
that the ontological experience of those communities is missing. By relying on 
Sageman, I extend the idea of ‘what’ war is, and how its impacts are wider 
than often considered. The review further highlights my familiarity with the 
wider literature and how my work is grounded in this knowledge.  
2. I argue that the War on Terror incorporates the entire world into a warzone 
that is contested through military interventions and through domestic 
counterterrorism policy – widening our understanding of the ‘where’ of its 
location. My research demonstrates that the impact of counterterrorism policy 
is felt, as an experience of war, outside of and beyond the arena of war – 
traditionally understood as a contention between two or more states through 
armed forces (Dinstein, 2001: 4). Whether it is the War on Terror’s language, 
such as ‘enemy combatant’ that makes its way from Guantanamo Bay to the 
Horn of Africa, or family members seeking justice for their detained loved 
ones being abused, these all constitute a spatial extension of where war is 
located, furthering our understanding of ‘war’.  
3. My work challenges the established narrative of ‘when’ the response to the 
attacks of 11 September 2001 actually began, through my investigation of the 
case of Nihad Karsic and Almin Hardaus (Qureshi, 2009a). Traditionally it is 
assumed within the Critical Terrorism Studies literature that the War on Terror 
began with the invasion of Afghanistan. Through primary source investigation 
work, however, I have contributed evidence that two weeks after the Twin 
Tower attacks, the US military were detaining and torturing individuals as part 
of their global prosecution of counter-terrorism policy. I extend this idea of the 
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War on Terror taking place in peacetime jurisdiction by arguing that at the 
level of the ontological experience, an actor may not conceive of being in a 
‘war’ until they are subjected to its sharp-end through counterterrorism policy. 
An analysis of lived experience thus offers a new temporal dimension to the 
War on Terror. 
4. Drawing on the wider range of fieldwork and experience accumulated in the 
course of my work, I have developed a matrix that connects the experiences of 
the War on Terror both domestically and abroad, to show that the system of 
suspicion and policy is self-reinforcing – presenting the ‘how’ of the War on 
Terror. This matrix demonstrates that drone strikes and rendition flights 
abroad do not exist in a vacuum but rather are connected to what is happening 
domestically within the United Kingdom. This matrix contributes to 
knowledge by showing how the War on Terror replicates and self-reinforces 
its paradigm at both international and domestic levels. Using the cases of 
Mahdi Hashi, and later Umm Ahmed, I argue that there is no independent 
policy that exists outside of the logic of the War on Terror, but rather that 
policies are grounded in its language, its epistemology and its ontology.    
5. The final contribution to Critical Terrorism Studies, rests in my positionality 
with respect to the suspect community that I seek to assist in mitigating the 
impacts of the global War on Terror. Alongside the organisation CAGE, I hold 
the state to account for its excesses in counterterrorism policy, while being 
subject to the full spectrum of the state’s tools of repression. An analysis of 
this positionality extends the idea about ‘how’ war as an experience manifests 
itself, as communities enter into a dialectical relationship with the state. 
Drawing on the work of Khalili (2013), Sabir (2017), and Boykoff (2007), I 
show how the logic of counterinsurgency policy as used within conflicts 
abroad is replicated in the tactics of repression at home, furthering our 
understanding of how the War on Terror is deployed to create an experience of 
war in peacetime UK.   
  
Although Critical Terrorism Studies is the field in which the majority of contributions 
are being made, this thesis also contributes to Critical Military Studies, and in 
particular to its investigation of war as experience. I will show how both disciplines 
can benefit from extending their frame of reference to understand counterterrorism as 
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creating actual experiences of war. Sylvester explains that the traditional definition in 
international relations understanding of war, is ‘collective violence used to achieve a 
political agenda’, but then goes on to suggest that we should consider the nature of 
that collective violence, rather than taking its existence as the defining fact (2013: 3). 
In considering this nature of war, Barkawi and Brighton refer to it as a “social activity 
related to the whole complex of social life and organization” (2011, 132). Through the 
course of this thesis, I am particularly interested in what constitutes a warzone beyond 
a specific location. Nordstrom argues that an ethnography of war cannot be 
understood in the same way as a location specific ethnography of the effect of war 
(Nordstrom, 1997: 78). For her, the ethnography of the warzone required shifting 
focus from:  
 
“…relying on traditional ethnography rooted in a single locale to looking for 
understanding of the area of conflict itself. I grounded my ethnography in a 
topic and a process, not a place.” (Nordstrom, 1997: 78) 
 
The warzone, as I understand it to be in the course of this thesis, is not limited to a 
specific location, but rather is understood as experience. With this in mind, the five 
contributions to knowledge presented above will form the structure of this 
introduction, referencing the published works that form this thesis. By following each 
section through, my aim is to provide a more complete understanding of the ‘what’, 
‘where’, ‘when’ and ‘how’ of the War on Terror by demonstrating the key 
contribution that experiential knowledge makes here. As a final section, I consider 
some of the limitations of my work, especially with regard to my positionality to the 
suspect community I seek to assist. This is all based on the submissions I will be 
including in this thesis: 
1. An Epistemic Break from Expertise 
2. Researching Rendition and Torture in the War on Terror 
3. Rules of the Game: Detention, Deportation, Disappearance  
4. Prevent: Creating radical to strengthen anti-Muslim narratives  
5. The UK Counter-Terrorism Matrix: Structural Racism and the case of Mahdi 
Hashi 
6. Fight the Power: How CAGE resists from within a “suspect community” 
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Moving Critical Studies beyond epistemology  
 
“Can the ontics of violence (the lived experience of violence) and the 
epistemology of violence (the ways of knowing and reflecting about violence) 
ever be realistically separated? Should an attempt even be made to situate 
violence in any of these domains? While recognizing that violence may be 
expressed as actions, emotions, responses, drives, or states of being, is it not 
dangerous to essentialize the definition of violence? To do so stereotypes core 
dimensions of human existence and leads to a tendency to fix violence as a 
"natural" category with "universal" expressions.” (Nordstrom, 1997: 116) 
 
Carloyn Nordstrom correctly identifies that violence, when studied, must be 
understood from both the ontological and epistemological levels – the two cannot 
exist without one another. Within the world of Critical Terrorism Studies, the impact 
of counter-terrorism policy has largely focused at the level of epistemology.   
 
To better understand how epistemology plays a role within the nexus of policy and 
experience, the first contribution to the thesis is a review of Professor Marc 
Sageman’s 2016 book ‘Misunderstanding Terrorism’, which seeks to address the 
actual ‘threat’ of terrorism posed by Muslims in the West. Although the review is 
largely dedicated to Sageman’s book, the first part discusses more generally the state 
of terrorism expertise and literature, in particular looking at the works of experts who 
defend counter-terrorism policies Raffaello Pantucci and Shiraz Maher. I argue that 
the work of such writers self-reinforces the threat of terrorism by creating knowledge 
that presents a higher risk of its occurrence based on problematic empirical 
understandings, that are then used to promote the need for further counterterrorism 
policy (Qureshi, 2017: 4). The review also demonstrates in depth knowledge of the 
terrorism and critical terrorism studies literature, and how my published works are 
grounded in an understanding the complexity of opposing arguments.  
 
My main contention is that many narratives from the perspective of terrorism studies 
refuse to see the human impact of policies within communities. Sageman’s book 
perfectly summarises the impact that a false epistemology can have at a community 
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level – as he explains the disproportionate ways in which Muslim communities are 
targeted by profiling exercises in the West. His Bayesian probability analysis of 
terrorism statistics over a ten-year period, lead him to the conclusion that the response 
to the alleged threat is grossly disproportional:  
 
“If all the various police departments in the West collaborate and carry out a 
gigantic sweep by applying this profile to their respective Muslim populations 
in order to catch terrorists hiding in their respective societies, they would 
arrest all 22 terrorists that emerge in a given year. However, they would make 
a mistake 1 percent of the time for 25 million people, which comes to 250,000 
people. Therefore, in order to catch all new 22 global neo-jihadi terrorists, 
they would put 250,000 Muslims in jail by mistake. This rate of error of 99.99 
percent is simply not acceptable in a liberal democracy.” (Sageman, 2016: 63) 
 
The review contributes to Critical Terrorism Studies in placing the significance of 
knowledge and its construction of the threat of terrorism. As Sageman identifies, the 
current approach has resulted in widespread scrutiny of Muslims that would be 
considered discrimination by any standard (Kiai, 2017: 3). This is important, as it 
creates an environment where a polarisation is necessitated as the idea of ‘what if’ 
takes root, placing the vast majority of those who present no threat within a threat 
matrix.  
 
Part of this discussion is the way in which ‘the problem’ is constructed – it is a matter 
of epistemology. In understanding the violence of counterterrorism policies can we 
reduce the violence simply to the level of its physical presence, or does it also operate 
at the epistemic level? Based on the review of Marc Sageman’s book 
‘Misunderstanding Terrorism’ it can be argued that epistemology is itself a site of 
‘war’, creating its own experiences. Part of the issue is the way in which ‘terrorism’ 
itself, and what counts as terrorism, is politically contested. While Critical Terrorism 
Studies scholars have examined this contestation, they have not examined how the 
epistemology of counterterrorism translates to the experience of those on the ground. 
As Sageman informs us:  
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“Honest scholars in the field self-categorize on the side of the state and, like 
any other in-group member in a conflict, are blind to their own in-group’s 
contribution to the process and completely blame the out-group for any 
violence. The state contribution to the process leading to political violence 
may be the most important still unexplored topic in the field. 
Acknowledgment of this contribution will help us understand this process and 
may even start a counter process that can defuse this type of political violence 
before it erupts.” (Sageman, 2016: 131) 
 
The War on Terror exceeds the boundaries of the traditional conflict, in terms of 
space and experience, but also in terms of its meaning. Sageman, Jackson, Breen-
Smyth and others within the critical world identify that the way we understand the 
War on Terror requires rethinking, and my work pushes further their contribution by 
including actual human experience in the study of the War on Terror.  
 
In the nascent field of Critical War or Critical Military Studies, Tarak Barkawi and 
Shane Brighton have sought to ask these very questions of the way in which war is 
constructed, as they reject the idea that current studies of war have been adequate in 
describing it (Barkawi and Brighton, 2011: 130). For them, analysing the 
‘uncertainty’ of what war is needs to be understood through the characteristics that are 
part of the ontology of war (Barkawi and Brighton, 2011: 138). They see studies of 
war as being wholly inadequate in dealing with the complex myriad phenomena that it 
constitutes:  
 
“Underlying the decentering of war and its apprehension through, and 
reduction to, other social domains is the more fundamental problem of the 
conceptual black hole surrounding the notion of war itself. What is it? How 
ought we to think about it, inquire into it, and situate it in relation to other 
political and social phenomena? Questions of this sort require collective and 
sustained scholarly endeavor and debate. What is missing, then, is a scholarly 
project that takes war as its central object of analysis and is adequate to it.” 
(Barkawi and Brighton, 2011: 129) 
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As the authors correctly note, there is a paucity in material that centres the ontology 
of war, which they also claim aids in determining the epistemology of war – that latter 
requires the former – as they support one another in making war ‘knowable’ (Barkawi 
and Brighton, 2011: 134). This paucity is also evident in terrorism or counterterrorism 
studies: addressing this gap is one of the key contributions that my own published 
works make.  
 
 
Where is ‘war’ located?  
 
Fieldwork blurs the existence of legal distinctions and categories within zones of 
conflict; they have been found to be inadequate in the context of the ‘War on Terror’. 
The second paper presented in this thesis: ‘Researching rendition and torture in the 
War on Terror: lessons from a human rights organisation’ (Qureshi, 2009) highlights 
some of the ways in which CAGE1 has worked with survivor communities around the 
world, and how the experience of those communities have contributed to alternative 
understandings of conflict.  
 
The paper focuses on the research methodology implemented in gathering primary 
evidence, often at the sites where the abuses are taking place, whether that is in the 
jungles of Likoni in Mombasa, the tribal regions of Pakistan, or the outskirts of 
London. Being present and on the ground to gather evidence and conduct interviews 
became crucial to understanding how a global conflict at least experientially emerged. 
 
Nordstrom’s experiences in Mozambique highlight the importance of being present, 
and using the ontic lens to widen our understanding of war. Crucially, Nordstrom 
allows the voices of those who are affected to guide her thinking, rather than applying 
her own assumptions to their experience:  
 
																																																								
1 CAGE is an independent grassroots organisation striving for a world free of injustice and oppression. The 
organisation campaigns against discriminatory state policies and advocate for due process and the rule of law. My 
role in the NGO is currently as the Research Director, and have been involved in conducting fieldwork, 
researching and writing reports based on interviews conducted around the world.  
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“…War is when your loved ones die, when you lose your mother and father, 
when you see your friends lost and die. War is running, leaving your home 
and trying to find safe places [most of the children had fled their birthplaces 
due to the war]. War is always being scared and hungry.” Here the children 
began to tell me about their war experiences in general, tying that day's 
episode into a larger portrait of "living war" as a reality of life. Then, 
expanding into the impact of war on their lives: “We can't go to school, we 
can't go visit our grandparents and cousins, we can't grow up like we want to.” 
(Nordstrom, 1997: 21)  
 
Nordstrom’s study places impact within a wider frame of thinking, showing us how, 
in Brighton’s first proposition on the phenomenology of war, “war presents a surfeit 
of being over knowing.” (Brighton, 2011: 102) It is contended in this introduction and 
in my published works that the War on Terror globalises these very experiences, it 
disorders by in effect making the entire world a warzone. As proven with early work 
about those detained at Guantanamo Bay, perhaps nothing speaks of the global nature 
of the War on Terror and the experiences of war it produced than this one 
phenomenon (Sands, 2006: 18 and Stafford-Smith, 2008: 122).  
 
As signposted at the beginning of this introduction, the spatial widening of the War on 
Terror, to make the experience of war one that can take place in non-war zones, 
makes an important original contribution to terrorism studies. The ‘Researching 
rendition’ article presents how a single phone call on the morning of 30 January 2007 
resulted in months of investigation, travel across Europe and Africa and ultimately the 
release of many of the individuals CAGE ended up working for. The human 
experience of war, as a matter of geography, was not spatially limited to the site of 
conflict in Somalia, but rather, could be found traversing across the world.  
 
On day one, we assumed we would be representing four British men, who had fled 
Somalia at the start of Ethiopia’s invasion between 2006 to 2007. They fled across the 
border into Kenya at the start of the fighting, only to be detained by the Kenyan Anti-
Terrorism Police Unit, and further questioned by Mi5 during their detention. Due to 
the environment of the ‘War on Terror’, raising the prospect of someone being 
detained abroad illegally did not always result in assistance from the authorities, 
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rather the conflict abroad could find itself manifested in violent police raids in the 
United Kingdom (Qureshi, 2009: 370). 
 
The United Kingdom is ostensibly outside of the warzone, but it is contented that a 
unique feature of the global ‘War on Terror’ is that it draws victims, their families and 
indeed bystanders, into the logic of a global war. After having been involved in 
helping to secure the release of the British men and have them safely returned to the 
UK, we were able to procure the flight manifests of the rendition flights they had been 
placed on. Here we found the names of over eighty individuals, men, women and 
children, from a range of nationalities who had been placed on illegal flights from 
Kenya to Somalia (from the war they had fled) and then on to Ethiopia. On reaching 
Ethiopia, it appeared that the global War on Terror had produced a kind of ‘best 
practice’ of national security policy in a conflict environment, by using questionable 
legal terms and housing detainees in cages:  
 
“One of the worrying aspects of the detention of the African rendition 
detainees was their status on arrival in Ethiopia. Benaouda explained that the 
first time they were brought before a court in Addis Ababa, the judge 
explained to all of them that they were investigating whether or not these 
detainees were ‘enemy combatants’.” (Qureshi, 2009: 373) 
 
Just as men had been detained in chicken wire cages at Camp X-Ray at Guantanamo 
Bay, these eighty detainees were detained in similar cages in Ethiopia. Regardless of 
the status of some of the men and women as potential combatants, there is no possible 
cause for the children having been processed as potential ‘enemy combatants’ – a 
term that is legally vague and not based in any international law precedent within the 
Geneva Conventions. This fieldwork we conducted makes an important contribution 
to understanding not only where ‘war’ is located within the War on Terror but also the 
different ways in which it manifests itself.  
 
If one of the contributions this thesis makes is that the physical geography of the ‘War 
on Terror’ is expanded beyond what we consider to be the ‘warzone’, the third 
submission, ‘Rules of the Game: Detention, Deportation, Disappearance’, extends that 
notion even further by redefining political geography. As Brighton’s second 
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proposition informs us, social and political meanings are unmade and remade in war 
in a way that it is difficult for us to predict (Brighton, 2011: 104).  
 
‘Rules of the Game’ references the May 2002 declaration by the then US Ambassador 
to the United Nations, John Bolton, when he declared Syria as part of what he called 
the ‘Axis of Evil’. The presentation, for the view of the public, was that there was a 
cold-conflict taking place between the US and Syria, one of which President George 
W Bush said, “States like these, and their terrorist allies, constitute an axis of evil, 
arming to threaten the peace of the world.” (Bush in Qureshi, 2009a: 150) Only four 
months after John Bolton made his speech, a Canadian man of Syrian origin, Maher 
Arar, was forcibly placed on a rendition flight from JFK International Airport in New 
York and handed over to the Syrian intelligence services to be questioned and 
tortured. Publicly, the two countries were in a ‘cold’ conflict with each other, but 
privately, the War on Terror had redefined understandings of alliances and state 
relations to accommodate a secret relationship in the outsourcing of torture (Qureshi, 
2009a: 151).  
 
Arar’s case is just one example of how a very public political distance between two 
countries was bridged by their cooperation within the confines of the War on Terror. 
Among those declared as part of the ‘Axis of Evil’ was the Libyan government, and 
similarly they were involved in the rendition, interrogation and detention programme 
after having received Abdul Hakim Belhaj from the CIA during a similar period 
(Norton-Taylor, 2018). I argue that although there is a history of states acting in 
opposition to their public positions, the apparent binary nature of the War on Terror 
redefines our understanding of what the relationship between states are in ‘combatting 
terrorism’, through hidden cooperation between states seemingly in conflict with one 
another.  
 
It is worth thinking about Barkawi and Brighton again, as they understand that, “war 
consumes, reworks, and produces truths,” (Barkawi and Brighton, 2011: 139) and so 
the War on Terror due to its amorphous nature, is perhaps the epitome of this truth 




Missing within the larger political narratives, however, there is the human impact that 
the larger ‘War on Terror’ policies bring. The physical location does not minimise or 
maximise the impact as the experience can manifest itself in many different ways – 
drone strikes in Yemen or Waziristan can very much find their repercussions within 
family members in Western Europe. Similarly, the decision to remove an individual’s 
citizenship in the UK can result in their extrajudicial killing abroad. Christine 
Sylvester informs us of the multiple ways in which these experiences can manifest, 
and how researchers play a role in ‘accessing’ those experiences.  
 
“War experiences come in prosaic, profound, sickening, excruciating, and 
exhilarating ways, to all kinds of people living inside and outside actual war 
zones. Experiences of war provide information about what it is, how it 
operates, who takes part, how they are affected and affecting, and what the 
politics of war looks like beyond the war rooms of state. To access those 
experiences takes more than good intentions and interest. It requires that a 
researcher take a close look at herself/himself and a creative and acute look 
around at the mundanities and spectaculars, the tears and politics of life that 
accompany and that shape war.” (Sylvester, 2011: 129) 
 
 ‘Rules of the Game’, is based on the experiences of those who were impacted by the 
policies of the ‘War on Terror’. The book makes an original contribution to Terrorism 
Studies and in particular to understanding the War on Terror, specifically because it 
seeks to highlight the spread of this war across the globe, but also outside of the 
warzone. By presenting large sections of material taken directly from witnesses, I 
chose to retain the quality of their own words, over my own analysis, which I seek to 
intersperse between the testimony. What results is one of the widest demonstrations of 
the impact of the War on Terror, as other literature is limited by themes (such as 
torture), or geographical space (such as Abu Ghraib). With interviews with 
individuals from North America, through Guantanamo Bay, across the African 
continent and Western and Eastern Europe to the Middle East and South Asia, the 
book has a breadth of experience that captures the geography of global 
counterterrorism responses. The ‘breadth’ however is not limited to geography, but 
also policy, as the logic of profiling suspects on the streets of London is linked to the 
unlawful kidnapping and selling of detainees abroad. At a policy level, the 
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contribution presents empirical evidence of a wide range of policies and practices that 
are all interconnected through the War on Terror.  
 
The book tells of fourteen-year-old Zahra Paracha in Pakistan, whose father Saifullah 
Paracha remains at Guantanamo to this day:  
 
“My friends are all occupied in stuff like ‘does this shawl look good on me’ 
and they model in front of the mirror for like hours…and I’m looking at stuff 
like Lebanon and Israel war and I know if I ever mention it to them, they will 
have the dumbest look on this planet…and I wouldn’t blame them because 
they’re not really that old, they are only fourteen and when I realise that I am 
only fourteen then I realise there is something wrong with me.” (Qureshi, 
2009a: 125) 
 
Zahra is attuned to the disordering of her own life due to the detention of her father. 
Her experiences have placed her within a context where she has understood that the 
loss of access to her father, has placed her in a wider narrative that exists outside of 
‘normal’ teenage life. Her life itself has become a repository of meaning. The impact 
is not always psychological, it can also be physical and therefore transport the conflict 
more directly to the subject. Campaigning for her Bosnian husband, Boudella Haji, 
who was detained at Guantanamo Bay, Nadja Dizderavic would conduct long vigils 
outside of the Bosnian parliamentary buildings after his unlawful kidnapping and 
rendition. In her view, her activities resulted in violence being directed against her by 
unknown foreign men:  
 
“That man who was beating me, he was speaking English very quick and he 
was saying all bad words he was swearing…When I kick the guy, he raised his 
head, his eyes were bloody like an animal he took my head and hit me on the 
wall three times and kicked me in the stomach. Last thing I remember, 
because the stomach hit was so strong I was about to lose consciousness, he 




Temporal parameters of the War on Terror 
 
The above examples all point to the space of the War on Terror having been expanded 
to encompass the whole world. Thus, as part of counterterrorism policies, any location 
can be brought within the logic of its global emphasis. This thesis however by 
focusing on the experience of the War on Terror also broadens its time beyond what 
has been traditionally understood. 
 
Within the context of the War on Terror, it was in fact Bosnia that became ground 
zero for the US response to the attacks of 11 September 2001.  The legal and 
academic community largely focus on the American invasion of Afghanistan as being 
the starting point of the War on Terror response. However, a key contribution that this 
thesis makes and within the book, is that Bosnia became the first site of the ‘war’ 
manifesting itself with the detentions of three Bosnian men. This changes how CTS 
understands the US response to 9/11, as no longer can it be claimed that Afghanistan, 
that is the invasion of a country and the toppling of its government, is ground zero of 
the War on Terror; rather it was the identification of suspects globally, as part of a 
programme of rendition, detention and torture. The practice of rendition, detention, 
and torture precedes the practice of invading “terrorist safe-havens.” 
 
Indeed, On 24 September 2001 Abdel Hakim Khafagy, a 69-year-old Bosnian citizen 
was detained and taken to the US military base at Tuzla, Bosnia. The following day 
Nihad Karsic and Almin Hardaus were to share the same fate: 
 
“They did not allow me to sleep as it was regulation…They were putting me 
through sleep deprivation. This went on for many days. In the first few days it 
was very intensive, soldiers were coming, they were shouting at me terrorist 
and so on.” (Qureshi, 2009a: 172) 
 
For Karsic and Hardaus, their experience of detention and violence at the hands of US 
soldiers was not limited to wrongful allegations against them, but carried through to 
their release – the experience of war remained with them. Within the ‘Rules of the 
Game’, the idea of being in the “wrong place at the wrong time” pervades the War on 
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Terror’s counterterrorism lens, as individuals all over the world are documented to 
have suffered due to national security concerns. As already highlighted above in the 
contribution on Sageman’s work, a global policy has been developed to impact large 
populations placed under suspicion, with wide-ranging consequences for those who 
are innocent. This extends our understanding of the way in which an epistemology 
that is counter-productive, can have devastating consequences, particularly when the 
impact of those policies are not understood through the experience of survivor 
communities. Critical Terrorism Studies and Terrorism Studies, by placing the 
experience of the human at the centre of their understanding, will come away with a 
better-informed appreciation of how policy can potentially be counter-productive. 
 
In questioning her own assumptions about the experience of war, Harmonie Toros 
engaged in an exercise with her students to try and understand how they conceived of 
the experience of war, outside of the warzone, “pushing against the widespread 
assumption in IR that they could not be bearers of war experience” (Toros et al, 
2018). Although the range of student responses were fascinating to reflect on, for the 
purposes of this discussion one respondent stood out in particular. Yasmeen Omran 
described her experience of returning ‘home’ to the UK just after the Charlie Hebdo 
attacks with her partner from Amsterdam. After she is stopped under counterterrorism 
laws, Omran’s reflections are interesting, as her life choices had convinced her that it 
was not possible for her to be profiled in the way she was under Schedule 7 of the 
Terrorism Act 2000 (Toros et al, 2018). For Omran, the ‘War on Terror’ subjected her 
to an experience of war, one that took root at a cultural level:  
 
“What I was experiencing was so surreal after years of television and online 
newspapers fooling me to believe that it could never happen to someone like 
me… I found as a Muslim and Arab, I no longer needed to inhabit or have 
roots in states of war or dress in my religious garments to be placed in the box 
of potential terrorist. My identity and my appearance had condemned me to 
fight for my right to simply exist within this state without some sort of ulterior 
motive.” (Omran in Toros et al, 2018: 5) 
 
Omran is a British national, who was returning home from holiday, and despite that, 
was made to feel like a threat to the UK. There are layers to Omran’s case, as it tells 
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us ‘where’ the War on Terror can be located, but also, as an experience of war, 
‘when’. Until that moment of detention, Omran was not aware of the relevance of the 
War on Terror’s policies in her life, but it arrived and became part of her lived 
experience at the airport.  
 
Similarly, in September 2002, Moloud Sihali was detained by the government and 
placed under harsh restrictions that controlled his movement outside of his home, 
despite not having any connection to terrorist activity. Sihali described himself as 
someone who was irreligious and so did not fit a profile, and yet was still targeted for 
being simply foreign (Qureshi, 2009a: 34). 
 
The War on Terror has created layers of war experiences for those who are suspected 
within the prism of its logics. The violence that occurs, takes place at many different 
levels, as Galtung describes, from direct violence to structural violence to cultural 
violence (Galtung, 1990) – these are all forms of violence that reinforce and support 
the logic of one another in the context of the War on Terror. ‘Rules of the Game: 
Detention, Deportation, Disappearance’ presents the breadth of these experiences, as 
individuals find themselves fundamentally changed by the War on Terror.  
 
This section and the one prior to it argue that my work has extended the War on 
Terror beyond previous understandings by investigating its lived experience. In 
particular, it has been extended spatially to include the entire globe as a potential site 
of war experience, but also temporally. In the context of the UK, for instance, daily 
life might not seem so much of a conflict, until you are stopped at an airport, an 
instance of a ‘how’ and ‘when’ of the War on Terror, for the individual, has arrived 
and located them.   
 
What the work contributes, is the understanding of the subject of the War on Terror 
being far more diverse than otherwise might be imagined. As Shane Brighton’s 
second proposition informs us, the political and social meanings of these subjects are 
permanently changed by their interaction with the War on Terror, even if the impact 
of the counterterrorism policy is not direct but felt through the trauma of being a 
family member of the one impacted. Zahra Paracha and Yasmeen Omran understand 
that things have changed for them, but with it comes the difficult acceptance that it 
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The self-reinforcing war experience  
 
The fourth contribution to this thesis focuses again on the ‘how’ of the War on Terror 
through a matrix I put forward in the book chapter, ‘The UK counter-terrorism 
matrix: Structural racism and the case of Mahdi Hashi’ (Qureshi, 2017b). This draws 
together 14 years of CAGE’s experience in the field and studying the UK’s policies of 
the War on Terror. The chapter offers the first complete map of how all aspects of 
British counter-terrorism policy intersect and reinforce one another. This is the first 
time that any organisation has sought to map policies from intelligence sharing 
exercises with foreign agencies to civil sanction policies such as citizenship 
deprivation to the ‘pre-crime’ policy of Prevent.  
 
Although it would have been possible to present this chapter in more abstract terms, 
in designing the matrix, I was able to test its validity and logic by running fifty of my 
real-life cases through its flow system. By the time I arrived at the version I presented 
in this chapter, I had a 100% rate of accuracy across the cases I ran. In some 
instances, a suspect would be detained abroad, and so their case would be followed 
through the flow system until they arrived in the UK, and then chart their experience 
afterwards. In other circumstances, the individual might be suspected in the UK, only 
for them to travel abroad and be impacted by the domestic suspicion.  
 
This matrix presents an original contribution to research on counterterrorism policy in 
the UK. When terrorism experts and indeed, even the formal government appointed 
position of the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation assess 
counterterrorism policies, they separate them as disparate elements with no 
interconnectivity – so Prevent policy is seen as independent to deportation orders or 
citizenship deprivation orders. In reality, these are closely linked and it is a failure of 
the way in which they are assessed that allows abuses to take place across the 
spectrum. This chapter contributes to the understanding of Critical Terrorism Studies 
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by UK counterterrorism policy and practices by showing how these policies have an 
internal logic that reinforces the single parts of the system.  
 
“Where foreign nationals have not committed any crimes, they can be 
deported (or subjected to other sanctions) under secret evidence based on 
arbitrary orders. Where UK nationals have not committed any crimes, they can 
have their citizenship removed (and other sanctions) over an arbitrary 
allegation of extremism. All of this works to provide the UK government with 
wide powers to be able remove perceived threats, even where those threats 
pose no imminent or long-term danger to the security of the UK.” (Qureshi, 
2017b: 81) 
 
Although his case does not touch every single part of the system, in the chapter I 
decided to focus on the case of Mahdi Hashi due to the volume of points of 
intersection his story had to the matrix both in the UK and abroad. The purpose of the 
chapter was to present an understanding of the intersection and violence of policy. 
Nevertheless, its significance could not be fully understood except through a human 
story with Hashi’s being particularly compelling.  
 
At the age of sixteen, Mahdi Hashi was detained in Egypt being accused of numerous 
crimes including of being involved with Chechen mujahideen – unlikely considering 
his recent completion of GCSEs in the UK and only having recently arrived in Egypt 
in 2006. Instead of being assisted by the British consular authorities as a minor, Hashi 
felt he was being interrogated by the very people whose duty it was to assist him: 
 
“…how I felt at the time, that they are trying to make me admit something, to 
make me say it first. I was speaking to the embassy they were trying to ask me 
why I was here, 'The Egyptian authorities are telling us something else.'” 
(Qureshi, 2017b: 83) 
 
Mahdi Hashi had been brought by the Egyptian and British authorities into the War 
on Terror by using his vulnerable position in order to interrogate him. Even on 
Mahdi’s return to the UK, instead of providing him with medical or psychological 
services based on his experience in an Egyptian prison, he was held for hours at the 
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UK airport as a minor and interrogated about his beliefs with his DNA being forcibly 
taken (Qureshi, 2017b: 83). As with the experience of Yasmeen Omran, the entry or 
exit at any UK port has become a moment of tension for many who are identified as 
being Muslim, and on some occasions even those who are not. The powers as they are 
used under Schedule 7 of the Terrorism Act 2000 have been used well beyond the 
requirement that the border agents suspects that an individual has been involved in the 
commission, preparation or instigation of an act of terror. As I describe in the book 
chapter through direct interviews with those from Mahdi Hashi’s community, the war 
experience of Yasmeen Omran and those I have interviewed was a common one, as 
the affected individuals found themselves in a state of conflict with the state. 
(Qureshi, 2017b: 84-86) 
 
Despite the many attempts to coopt or coerce Mahdi Hashi into working for the 
security agencies, attempts that can only be described as a programme of harassment, 
eventually he felt compelled to leave the UK. The matrix uniquely is able to chart 
how Mahdi’s experiences with stops at the airports and the programme of harassment 
all contributed to his designation as a threat. Once abroad, the matrix shows how 
Hashi was moved into a different section, where the untested allegation of ‘Islamist 
extremism’ was enough to deprive him of his citizenship, resulting in his torture and 
rendition at the hands of the US. (Qureshi, 2017b: 90)  
 
Mahdi Hashi moved through different stages of his experiences of the War on Terror 
in the course of his travels since the age of sixteen. From his torture in Egypt, to the 
profiling and harassment in the UK, to the detention by al-Shabab in Somalia for 
allegedly being a spy, to the detention, torture and rendition by the United States – his 
case stands as a noteworthy example of how the logics of counterterrorism policy of 
the War on Terror creates a self-reinforcing war experience. The matrix makes an 
original contribution to knowledge in the field of Critical Terrorism Studies as it 
allows researchers and policymakers to see how the repercussions of policies can 
travel and have unintended consequences. While a specific policy on its own might 
appear to have some merit, when placed within the larger structure, it can instead 
reinforce areas which are already impacting on communities in negative ways. For 
example, in an environment where counterterrorism policing was already prevalent, 
the introduction of pre-crime, as will be seen below with the case of Umm Ahmed, 
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provides an extra layer of abuse that while seemingly separate, is completely 
connected to the larger system.   
 
The chapter provides us with a view of how Hashi found himself being the subject of 
the structural violence of the state. However, Galtung allows us to extend structural 
violence, by helping us to understand that there is a third category of violence that is 
‘cultural’ (Galtung, 1990: 291). As counterterrorism policy moves into the world of 
ideas through international programmes known as Countering Violent Extremism 
(CVE) and in the UK context, Prevent, the notion of cultural violence (Galtung, 1990: 
298) connects and reinforces existing systems of direct and structural violence.  
 
As we have seen throughout this introduction, the War on Terror exceeds the 
boundaries of the traditional conflict, in terms of space and experience, but also in 
terms of its meaning. Barkawi and Brighton provide another layer to this 
understanding, by considering ‘liberal modernity’ as a ‘civilisational’ starting point in 
considering ‘war’, that it actually attempts to bracket and construct it in a ‘normative 
register’ (Barkawi and Brighton, 2011: 141). If liberal modernity is the constructing 
force, then where does this leave the experience of the victims or survivors, but more 
importantly, the experience of being the subjects of that construction?  
 
‘PREVENT: creating “radicals” to strengthen anti-Muslim narratives’ (Qureshi, 2015) 
places a case within a wider context and narrative about the UK government’s Prevent 
strategy. The piece argues that on 5 February 2011, former UK Prime Minister David 
Cameron gave a speech on security in Munich where, unlike Sageman, he places the 
blame of ‘Islamist terrorism’ on ideology over all else:  
 
“At the furthest end are those who back terrorism to promote their ultimate 
goal: an entire Islamist realm, governed by an interpretation of sharia. Move 
along the spectrum, and you find people who may reject violence, but who 
accept various parts of the extremist world-view including real hostility 
towards western democracy and liberal values. It’s vital we make this 




By placing the idea of a ‘conflict’ outside of politics and into the realm of ideas, 
Cameron effectively contributes to the weaponisation of narratives and language, by 
establishing a counterterrorism epistemology – one that is not without consequence 
for the experience of those who will feel its effects. 
 
At the centre of the piece is an interview conducted with Umm Ahmed (not her real 
name) that shows how an individual, who was never considered to be a threat to the 
UK, was not only convicted of a terrorism offence, but also placed through a 
mandatory ‘deradicalisation’ programme. Although the matrix was developed years 
after the publication of this piece, it extends the ideas of the matrix by showing how 
counterterrorism legislation prosecutes individuals for non-violent offences, and then 
internally reinforces the notion of a threat, despite no threat having existed. 
 
This piece provides a unique contribution to narratives that surround the War on 
Terror and the way they are deployed, particularly in the space of ‘ideas’ – the ‘war’ 
moves from the space of violence to one of narratives, but ultimately back to 
violence. Nordstrom describes the breadth of how we understand violence: 
 
“Violence is culturally constitutive. Its enactment forges, in fact forces, new 
constructs of identity, new socio-cultural relationships, new threats and 
injustices that reconfigure people's life-worlds, new patterns of survival and 
resistance.” (Nordstrom, 1997: 141) 
 
In 2012, Umm Ahmed was charged with possession of a terrorism publication, what 
is known as a strict liability offence – requiring no intention – just mere possession of 
a magazine meant that she had committed an offence. Due to her relationship to 
others who had been convicted of terrorism, Umm Ahmed was advised to plead guilty 
to the offence by her solicitor, explaining that a jury would not be willing to see her as 
an individual. In his comments during her sentencing hearing, she was told by her 
judge:  
 
“She is of good behaviour and a good Muslim. Against this background, I 
accept on the evidence before me that this defendant gathered together the 
contents of the SD card in order to explore and understand the charges which 
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her brothers faced. There is no evidence that she was motivated by their 
ideology or was preparing to follow them.” (Qureshi, 2015: 186) 
 
Umm Ahmed describes how, despite this statement by the judge, he went on to 
describe his uncertainty as to whether or not she might have been a “fellow traveller” 
with her brothers, and so handed down a 12-month custodial sentence, in order that 
she be forced to go through a mandatory deradicalisation programme under Prevent. 
This case is an important example of how the perception of threats within 
counterterrorism are reinforced through cases such as a Umm Ahmed’s, where 
individuals who have no intention of causing harm, become terrorism conviction 
statistics, but also examples of ‘successful’ deradicalisation.  
 
Where does this leave Umm Ahmed though? When we consider the human 
experience of ‘war’ and the way in which the global War on Terror has been 
constructed, it is informative to know how she conceives of her place within it:  
 
“After all of this has finished for me, personally, I do believe that they have 
completely overestimated the threat that is posed, and their response is 
completely disproportional. I think that the security agencies have lost all 
control of the “war on terror” and have lost sight of what they were after in the 
first place. It is no longer about dangerous Muslims, but the ideology of Islam 
itself – and that is the one thing that they cannot contain, they don’t know how 
to contain it.” (Qureshi, 2015: 190) 
 
Returning to the idea of the UK’s counterterrorism matrix that I presented in the book 
chapter discussed above, Umm Ahmed’s case presents the experience of the War on 
Terror at a level that is constituted outside of even notions of countering violence, to 
countering ideas. During the interview with Umm Ahmed in 2014, she spoke of the 
‘deradicalisation’ tools that authorities used against her in prison. Among these tools 
was a psychological one called the Extremism Guidance 22+ (ERG), a tool that had 
not been publicly written about in terrorism policy literature. Umm Ahmed described 
her experience with the ERG in prison: 
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“I remember when they conducted my assessment, they explicitly stated that 
they did not consider me any kind of threat, or that I saw the UK public as a 
target or enemy, but during the ERG they were keen to know about my 
feelings on proscription of organisations…They asked about al-Muhajiroon, 
and I explained that under their categorisation, then yes they could potentially 
be proscribed, but then I said that the same standard should be applied to the 
EDL. The woman conducting the interview said she agreed with my viewpoint 
and that the EDL was a dangerous organisation – however – she still wrote 
into my record that I displayed having an “us versus them” mentality.” 
(Qureshi, 2015: 189) 
 
Umm Ahmed’s reference to the ERG highlighted that psychological tools were being 
developed in order to ‘deradicalise’ Muslims, based on some form of peer-reviewed 
science – but hidden behind layers of national security secrecy. This is explored more 
fully in the final contribution to this thesis, the journal piece ‘Fight the Power: how 
CAGE resists from within a “suspect community”’.  
 
 
‘Peace’ is ‘war’   
 
The final contribution of my published works takes the investigation of ‘how’ the War 
on Terror manifests itself further, by showing that the theory and practice of 
counterinsurgency policies within conflicts abroad are brought to bear in a peacetime 
domestic situation at home – leading to an experience of war at community and 
organisational levels. Within the law, peace has been described largely through the 
absence of a conflict of hostilities, usually between two belligerent states 
(Schwarzenberger and Brown, 1976: 156) However, Brighton (2011) along with 
Barkawi (2011) help us to understand that our understanding of peace in war studies, 
has been limited by our understanding of both war and peace – in my mind this is 
particularly so in the context of the War o Terror. As Angela Davis captures, the 
wide-reaching impact of the War on Terror can be seen as part of militarisation 
globally:   
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“I’m trying to suggest that there are connections between the militarization of 
the police in the US, which provides a different context for us to analyze the 
continuing, ongoing proliferation of racist police violence, and the continuous 
assault on people in occupied Palestine, the West Bank, and especially in 
Gaza, given the military violence inflicted on people in Gaza this past 
summer.” (Davis, 2016: 140)  
 
This militarisation cannot be seen in a vacuum that is restricted to the War on Terror, 
but rather must be seen as emerging out of a longer tradition of counterinsurgency. It 
is important to acknowledge the work of Laleh Khalili, whose book ‘Time in the 
Shadows: Confinement in Counterinsurgencies’ establishes an important baseline in 
our understanding of how the logic of counterinsurgency has come to embed itself 
within counterterrorism policies today (Khalili, 2013; see also Cochrane, 2013: 30). 
In the same vein as Davis, Khalili cites Israel’s occupation of Lebanon and Palestine, 
and the US role in the ‘War on Terror’ as contemporary examples of how warfare in 
the twentieth century has been defined by liberal asymmetric warfare (Khalili, 2013: 
4). For Khalili, part of war is confinement (in its widest meaning) serving as a 
mechanism of control: 
 
“The theoreticians of these mechanisms of containment, of confinement 
instead of slaughter, envisioned and advertised their tactics as more humane, 
as more liberal, and ultimately as techniques for socially engineering the 
people and places they conquered. The unmentioned axis around which much 
counterinsurgency revolves is that of “race” or its euphemism “culture” and 
“civilization”. Paradoxically, the very “humanization” of asymmetric warfare 
and the application of liberal precepts to its conduct have legitimated war 
making as political intervention.” (Khalili, 2013: 3) 
 
The notion that liberal warfare is now humane and definable is part of the lie of the 
way that wars are fought. Michael Neu informs us that liberal justifications set ‘the 
very rules for how a moral discussion about war is to be conducted’ (Neu, 2018: 77). 
These justifications, however, mask the extent of the war experience, particularly in 
spaces outside of the warzone. If we turn to Shane Brighton’s third proposition on the 
phenomenology of war, we are presented with the notion that even in post-conflict, or 
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as I propose to extend Brighton, peacetime geographies outside of the ‘conflict-zone’, 
the logics of war continue to pervade. The War on Terror is, perhaps, the ultimate 
global manifestation of this. There are very few parts of the world that are not touched 
by its footprint, whether it is through the global trafficking of suspected terrorists on 
unlawful rendition flights, or narratives around ideologies of Islam, they all form a 
consistent narrative of a continued conflict.  
 
The position of the NGO CAGE, and my position within the organisation, places us at 
the heart of resistance towards narratives, epistemologies and ontologies that make up 
the War on Terror in its entirety. My final contributing article in this thesis ‘Fight the 
Power: how CAGE resists from within a “suspect community”’ is key, as it 
demonstrates how the War on Terror takes on dimensions that could never have been 
predicted on 12 September 2001. It does so by outlining a very personal sense of 
feeling under siege that accompanies our attempt to hold the state to account. Whether 
it is political or media narratives, colleagues arrested or stopped at airports, or 
governmental institutions pressuring funders, there is a palpable sense of a full-
spectrum response in which the entire machinery of the state is deployed.  
 
As evidenced from Khalili above, much of counterterrorism in a domestic setting, has 
been constructed from the world of counterinsurgency. Rizwaan Sabir writes of the 
way in which coercive surveillance and propaganda is deployed by the state in order 
to neutralise those who might, in a pre-crime sense, become future threats or those 
who speak through “the language of Islam.” (Qureshi, 2017a: 4) Sabir specifically 
draws the analogy of domestic policy creating an environment of combatants and 
civilians, and how the logics of counterinsurgency manifest themselves broadly: 
 
“…the surveilling of ‘all members of the community’ in order to determine 
which form of activity (or propaganda) needs to be targeted at them suggests 
that Prevent perceives law-abiding Muslims to be somehow susceptible to 
supporting or becoming involved in terrorism. Such a perception not only has 
a strong stench of Islamophobia but also shows how the counterinsurgency 
principle of treating the wider population as an enabler and supporter of 
insurgency and terrorism has been integrated into contemporary counter-
 30 
terrorism policy and practice. Such a practice erodes the distinction between 
civilians and combatants.” (Sabir, 2017: 12) 
 
It must be acknowledged here, that the journal article is titled ‘Fight the Power’ by 
choice, bringing it within the frame of conflict, but it is a framing that comes from 
lived experience. For me, the War on Terror replicates the idea of a global war, one 
that finds itself at home domestically. The title was borrowed from Public Enemy, 
largely because as the article’s introduction notes:  
 
“…the article argues that the violence and repression that has been targeted at 
CAGE is very much a continuation of historic policies targeted at people of 
colour/anti-racism activists in circumstances such as the Black Civil Rights 
movement in the United States or the anti-Apartheid movement in South 
Africa. The article concludes by offering some thoughts on what the targeting 
of a group such as CAGE, which seeks to engage in counter-hegemonic 
resistance activities suggests as well as the repercussions of the state’s 
coercion and violence against such resistance.” (Qureshi, 2017a: 2) 
 
The violence of the state is structural and cultural; in that way language and 
knowledge that is used can be part of the violence that is deployed against repressed 
communities (Galtung, 1990: 299). To quote Lina Mounzer’s essay on the way in 
which war is translated and how language itself can beat the drums of war: “We know 
how language itself can wage war against us, by mimicking the same casual 
dehumanization of a bomb.” (Mounzer, 2016) In the world of counterterrorism in the 
War on Terror, Sabir extends that thesis by writing on the way in which 
counterterrorism policy encroaches into the space of ideas themselves (Sabir, 2017). 
Further, not only engagement with the state, but potentially every single part of public 
life becomes a method of social control that serves to reinforce the War on Terror as a 
site of war: 
 
“CAGE understood that calling for justice and accountability, would mean 
that we would be decried as somehow anti-British, or anti-Western, even 
while our critique was also levelled against authority in the “East”. This 
identity of resistance is forged out of a particular form of knowledge that the 
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modalities of oppression cannot be separated from one another easily. Political 
and media narratives are linked to policymaking, which is associated to public 
perceptions, and intertwined with jury trials, which are closely tied to public 
sector employees under a statutory duty to inform—all of this culminates to 
give form to the structural racism—through repression and coercion.” 
(Qureshi, 2017a: 5)  
 
Our position in relation to the state and our communities is central to the ‘Fight the 
Power’ piece, as CAGE staff and volunteers are both actors and subjects within the 
War on Terror. CAGE simultaneously holds the state to account, while being subject 
to its institutions. The piece relies on Jules Boykoff’s ‘four mechanisms’ and ‘action 
modes’ of repression (Boykoff, 2007) within the context of the civil rights struggle in 
the US, and particularly within the context of the FBI’s Counter-Intelligence 
Programme (COINTELPRO). Going through Boykoff’s list, CAGE has been 
subjected to physical violence, public prosecutions, employment deprivation (funds 
being cut off), surveillance, infiltration, “black propaganda”, harassment arrests, 
extraordinary rules or laws, mass media manipulation and deprecation – so in other 
words, according to Boykoff’s categorisations, the full spectrum of repressive action 
modes he posits (Boykoff, 2007: 291-292).  
 
In terms of building a contribution to knowledge in Critical Terrorism Studies, this 
extends the ideas of Khalili and Sabir that counterinsurgency tactics and policing are 
actually connected to all institutions of the state which are then deployed domestically 
within the context of the War on Terror – a fact that is both privileged and 
encumbered by CAGE’s positionality to the suspect community it seeks to protect. 
This positionality as both actor and subject is perhaps most clear after the arrest of my 
colleague, Moazzam Begg: 
 
“CAGE received a letter from HM Treasury dated 14 March 2014, explaining 
that as Begg had been designated under Section 4(2) of the Terrorism Asset 
Freezing Act 2010, measures would need to be taken by the organisation to 
remove his name as a signatory to the account. The freezing, and ultimately 
closing of the CAGE account led to a loss of £3,000 per month in small 
standing order donations that had been set up by supporters of the 
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organisation. This was exacerbated by two significant donors, The Joseph 
Rowntree Charitable Trust and the Roddick Foundation, not being able to 
provide us with funds that they had cleared to support the organisation. It also 
gave the perception that somehow, CAGE’s activities were suspect and 
delegitimized.” (Qureshi, 2017a: 7) 
 
The experience of the organisation CAGE, and the fieldwork conducted around the 
world, exemplifies Shane Brighton’s third proposition beyond the idea of a ‘peace’ 
time logic of war. The way that the ‘War on Terror’ has been deployed displays 
modalities of war that move beyond the idea of post-war, as we can experience the 
‘how’ of the War on Terror, even when direct violence is not taking place. The 
‘peace’ itself manifests in experiences of war through repression within a domestic 
setting, and so as discussed in the previous sections on the spatial extension of the 
War on Terror, we can see the way it manifests within the peace. Policing, with its 
operation based on strategies of counterinsurgency, can very much take on the form 
of the war, as Khalili describes that the links between counterinsurgency and 
counterterrorism can be seen all too clearly abroad and at home (Khalili, 2017: 246). 
My own positionality, and that of my organisation CAGE, highlights specifically our 
knowledge and understanding of the structural violence of the War on Terror, as the 
state seeks to repress our activities through the logic of counterinsurgency thinking 
being funnelled into counterterrorism.  
 
 
Negative impact; positive outcomes: navigating research limitations 
 
In the previous section, I explained the main ways in which CAGE has been subjected 
to attack by the state. I now want to outline what the impact of such attacks have been 
on the community as well as the organisation. Secondly, I want to describe how 
CAGE have resisted and navigated the attacks. The purpose of highlighting both is to 
show that even though CAGE has faced serious challenges and attacks, some may 
perceive this to have limited the impact of my research findings – in the UK and 
around the globe. Ultimately, however, I want to show how they have actually had the 
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opposite impact; that is to say, how they have encouraged people to actually seek us 
out from around the world in order to help them.  
 
Part of the complexity and uniqueness of the positionality of this piece in relation to 
the War on Terror is to be inside what Paddy Hillyard called the ‘suspect community’ 
(Hillyard, 1993 and Qureshi, 2017a: 2). When the narrative, epistemology and 
ontology of the War on Terror have constructed Muslims and Islam as a threat, it has 
meant that 1.8 billion people in the world become subject to its logics. While that has 
permitted us to operate relatively unhindered within Muslim communities (Qureshi, 
2009: 374), belonging to the suspect community has also led to a series of challenges 
and problems, as I highlighted in the previous section (Qureshi, 2009: 374).   
 
One of these problems has been that Muslim communities have often been afraid to 
publicly associate themselves with us. This was perhaps most present in the case that 
CAGE brought against the UK Charity Commission. Only the Joseph Rowntree 
Charitable Trust was willing to publicly back CAGE’s successful case against the 
Commission (CAGE, 2017a: 7) whereas Muslim charities expressed fear of being 
targeted if they sided with CAGE in their case against them. While this is one limited 
experience, largely our experience, based on the ever-increasing cases we receive, is 
that CAGE’s authenticity and independence trumps any fears communities may have. 
However, the fear of being subjected to state violence is not only restricted to 
communities but is something that has impacted the team at CAGE too, and has 
subsequently impacted the way we operate. 
 
Although my positionality within CAGE and within communities occupies the space 
of a suspect in relation to the state, it is not my only position as I have both social 
capital (in my access to wider communities) and cultural capital (in my position 
within my own communities) (Bourdieu, 1989: 17). This positionality means that I 
have the privilege of respect. Part of the way I have sought to mitigate this is by never 
providing the subjects of my research or assistance solutions without giving them 
options and agency in the decisions that they take. Recognising the influence that I 
can have, it is important for clients or subjects to realise that the capital I have is in 
service to their needs as survivors.  
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Among the following reasons are why research participants and clients have been 
drawn towards me and towards CAGE more broadly. Firstly, the wealth of access that 
I have been given across the world to those who have experienced the violence of the 
policies of the War on Terror, primarily stems from my position within the 
community as a visibly observant Muslim, one who has studied law and so is in a 
potential position to help. My locus provides a degree of trust, particularly with an 
organisation such as CAGE in support. 
 
Secondly, based on the length of time I have been working in the field, and the 
breadth of experience that I have been able to accumulate, I can only see my 
positionality to the community as being one of authenticity for the concerns of my 
clients and research subjects. Understanding not only their concerns, but also their 
cultural needs is key to being able to represent them, especially in an environment 
where there is a lack of understanding about who Muslims are within liberal NGOs. 
As I specifically highlight in my ‘Fight the Power’ article, there is a degree of liberal 
complicity that undermines the experience of those who are suffering the 
consequences of the War on Terror (Qureshi, 2017a: 8), and for this reason in 
particular, it is important to have representation of those voices and experiences from 
within communities, especially in avenues and spaces such as research where these 
voices have largely been on the margins.  
 
In summary, while the attacks that CAGE have faced have been serious and sustained, 
one would think that they would have prevented our advocacy and research agenda, 
and ultimately limited the amount of impact we have had. However, these attacks 
have remarkably led to more people from around the world seeking us out for help 
and assistance in some of the most complex and politically charged circumstances. 
The status of being Muslim human rights activists thus is somewhat of a double edged 
sword: we have access and trust even among some of the most conservative 
communities around the world; however, by that same token, we become targets for 






Fieldwork throughout the geographies of the War on Terror – whether spatial, 
temporal, or human – has informed the thinking in this introduction and my published 
works that follow, concluding that there is an experience of ‘war’ that takes place 
outside of our traditional notions and zones of war. Scholars such as Sylvester, 
Nordstrom and Brighton have assisted us in renegotiating those assumptions around 
‘war’, but have been limited by their experiences and work. By presenting the 
experience of human beings affected in different contexts by the War on Terror, this 
piece has sought to extend our idea of counter-terrorism policy, and how it produces 
experiences of war.   
 
My thesis builds on and but extends and challenges the literature that currently exists 
on Critical Terrorism Studies and on the human experiences of war. It first addresses 
counterterrorism from the epistemological level, situating itself in the literature and 
work of CTS to show that counterterrorism narratives are not devoid of meaning, but 
have an ultimate impact on the communities they target. My review of the work of 
Marc Sageman is key to helping this understanding, as I seek to show ‘what’ the War 
on Terror is beyond traditional epistemological understandings.  
 
The ‘where’ of the War on Terror is also a key component to the furthering of our 
understanding, as I extend the spatial location of the War on Terror to include the 
whole world through war as experience. In that respect, the ‘when’ is equally 
important, as I not only move the timeline of the US response to 9/11 back from the 
war on Afghanistan to Bosnia, but further highlight how experientially, a person in a 
peacetime country can be drawn into the War on Terror through being impacted by its 
policies. They are until that moment oblivious that they may be impacted. Thus for 
them, in that moment, the War on Terror has begun. The book ‘Rules of the Game’ 
and article ‘Researching Rendition’ provide many important examples from the field 
at how individuals, often far away from the warzone, have been targeted and 
transformed by it.  
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The fourth section of this introduction uses a matrix of counterterrorism I developed 
to extend the idea of ‘how’ the War on Terror manifests itself, by providing evidence 
through the case of Mahdi Hashi and others. These cases show that there is a 
reinforcing system created by the War on Terror, that regardless of whether you start 
inside or outside of the warzone, can turn individuals into subject of its abuses. The 
human experience of war can take place in multiple ways and in multiple layers, 
providing breadth to our notions of war. What is particularly important about Hashi’s 
case is that the war followed him wherever he went once he was inside the system. 
 
The War on Terror, while taking on physical forms through detention, rendition and 
torture, also operates at the level of narrative and epistemology. The article 
‘PREVENT: creating “radicals” to strengthen anti-Muslim narratives’ shows the way 
in which threats are constructed, directly contributing to our understanding of ‘how’ 
counterterrorism policies reinforce themselves by constructing statistics through laws 
that criminalise non-violent behaviour. This extends our understanding of 
counterterrorism and how ‘terrorism’ is constructed, but also shows how those 
convictions help to reinforce the idea of a threat. 
 
The final key contribution in this thesis, is based on the 2017 journal piece, ‘Fight the 
Power: how CAGE resists from within a “suspect community”’, which extends the 
argument of the experience of war by considering the extension of counterinsurgency 
policies to the domestic setting. Through focusing on my experiences within the 
organisation CAGE, I present details of how the state practically carries out a 
counterinsurgency policy in a domestic setting. It is posited that Shane Brighton’s 
ideas around a ‘war’ continuing into peacetime, can be further extended by rethinking 
the very idea of peace. Despite North America and Western Europe being outside of 
the war zone, their domestic counterterrorism policies and repressive policies further 
create an environment of war within the communities they place under suspicion. 
 
Following on from thinking about the tactics of repression against CAGE, I consider 
the limitation of my research through my own positionality, as both an actor and 
subject of the ‘War on Terror’. While for some this may be considered a source of 
difficulty or contention for the subjects of my research, as the reach and access of my 
work has demonstrated, my positionality to communities has provided me an 
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authenticity that is unique among researchers looking into the impacts of 
counterterrorism.  
 
Terrorism Studies and Critical Terrorism Studies have for a long time been focused 
on the structures and meanings of the War on Terror, but have largely failed to take 
into account the human experiences that underpin the harm that has been caused. By 
drawing on the work of Sylvester, Barkawi, Brighton and Nordstrom, understandings 
of counterterrorism policy can be improved by referencing the human experience of 
war. This thesis seeks to extend both these fields by bringing them closer together and 
contributing the following published works of the lived experience of the War on 
Terror, so that in the search for better ways of keeping societies safe, the cost to 
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